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SUMMARY
This thesis studies and compares existing Numerical Result checking algorithms for
FFT computations under faults. In order to simulate faulty conditions, a fault injection
tool is implemented. The fault injection tool is designed so as to be as non-intrusive to
the application as possible. Faults are injected into memory in the form of bit flips in the
data elements of the application. The performance of the three result checking algorithms
under these conditions is studied and compared. Faults are injected at all the stages of the
FFT computation by flipping each of the 64-bits in the double-precision representation.
Experiments also include introducing random bit flips in the data array, emulating a more
real-life like scenario. Finally the performance of these algorithms under a set of worst-case
inputs is also studied.
xi
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In my thesis I study and compare the performance of existing Numerical Result Checking
algorithms for FFT under faulty conditions. The study also involves developing a software
fault injection mechanism that simulates faulty environments.
Numerical Result checking is a popular algorithm based error detection mechanism for
applications performing numerical computations. It is common for applications which are
prone to faulty conditions like bit flips in memory to resort to error detection mechanisms
that detect these occurrences. In numerical result checking, the output or the result of the
application is checked to detect any errors introduced in the application due to faults in
memory.
The result checker relies on post-conditions[1] that the computed output must satisfy in
order validate the accuracy of the computation. This check for the post-conditions has to
be done in a more numerically efficient manner than having to re-compute the output.
The result checker must be able to distinguish round-off errors from errors introduced
due to faults. If the difference between the computed output and expected output lies within
a threshold value, it is considered a round-off error. Any error larger than this threshold
is considered as an error due to a fault. Choice of this threshold value is an important
parameter and is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
This thesis focuses on Numerical result checking algorithms that exist for applications
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computing the Discrete Fourier Transform of input vectors. Discrete Fourier Transforms
are used extensively in RADAR applications[26], which are susceptible to such fault con-
ditions that can lead to errors in the computed output. This phenomenon is discussed in
detail in the next chapter. While our study is focused on the DFT, each of the error detec-
tion approaches being compared can be generalized to all unitary transformations such as
discrete cosine transformation (DCT). A unitary transformation is one in which the trans-
form matrix is unitary, i.e. 3401657398;: .
The study involves evaluating existing Numerical result checking algorithms for DFT
and comparing them under various parameters that are important in the performance of
an error detection mechanism. Each of these parameters is subsequently introduced in this
document. The Fault Injection tool implemented in order to inject faults into the application
is also described.
Experiments involve subjecting the FFT application under study to faults at various in-
stances and locations and evaluating the performance of each of the error-detection mecha-
nism being studied. Experiments are designed so as to evaluate the accuracy, efficiency and
coverage of each of these EDMs and a subsequent set of runs attempts to evaluate their per-
formance under various real-life-like faulty scenarios by introducing a pseudo-randomness
to the injected faults. A final set of runs involves a set of worst-case inputs generated
with sufficiently high zero-values in them, and the performance of each of these EDMs is
studied.
2
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The study involves evaluating the performance of error detection mechanisms under mem-
ory faults. There exist a number of conditions that can lead to such faults. Our primary
interest is transient faults that may be caused by single-event-upsets (SEUs). In SEUs,
high-energy particles produce spurious electrical signals, causing the state of transistors in
a memory cell to reverse, effectively causing the memory cell to change state from 1 to 0, or
0 to 1. This phenomenon is especially common in space-borne computers where memory is
exposed to such high-energy radiation. Memory faults are also caused by leakage of charge
in transistors, causing the value stored in a memory cell to change from 1 to 0. Gate-level
faults can result in the memory cell being stuck at 0 or 1. Other types of memory faults are
faulty address decoders, faults in the address/data line etc. As mentioned earlier, we will
be injecting memory faults that are transient in nature. Memory faults can be permanent or
transient in nature. Permanent faults can be emulated by injecting repeated memory faults
at a very high frequency.
Faults in memory could be latent or could manifest into errors. Latent memory faults
are faults that occur at a location in memory that never gets accessed or gets subsequently
overwritten.
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2.1 Round-off errors
Round-off errors arise because of the representation of real numbers with finite precision in
Computers (Please see section 7.4 for IEEE representation of double precision numbers).
In general round-off error growth is linear in the number of operations. Although roundoff
error in a single numerical operation is small , there are situations where the roundoff error
can become significant, or even catastrophic. For example when subtracting two numbers
of nearly equal value, and one or both of them have incurred round-off errors already, then
the difference between the two will result in a very small number and hence a very large
relative error. If  is the actual number and < is its truncated representation , then Relative
error is defined as +=?>@<ACBD . Absolute erroris defined as  ?>E< . Dividing a small
number by a very large number can result in a large relative error. The accumulation of
round-off errors depends on the way a computation in implemented. For example when a
small number is subtracted from a large number and this difference is again subtracted from
a large number we have a large round-off error. Instead if the computation is implemented
such that the two large numbers are subtracted first to obtain a small number which is then
subtracted from the small number, we avoid the large round off error.
2.2 Error Detection Mechanisms
Software Error Detection Mechanisms can be broadly classified into in-built error detection
at the operating system level and error detection at the application level.
Operating systems have in-built error-detecting mechanisms that signal an error to the
application under certain faulty conditions - for example when a malformed instruction is
encountered (illegal instruction), or when the application tries to access an address that
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does not exist or it does not have access to (segmentation violation), etc. Operating system
alerts the application of such errors via directed signals. Work has been done in evaluating
error-detection capabilities at an operating system level. Steininger et al. have studied
the effectiveness of various error-detection mechanisms in a Self-Checking RISC board by
injecting pin-level hardware faults[3]. Our study deals with the error-handling capability
of an application, built over the error-detecting capability of the operating system.
The virtual address space of an application process is divided into text segment that
stores instructions, static data segment that stores global variables and dynamic data seg-
ments including heap and stack that store dynamically allocated data and dynamically de-
clared variables respectively.
Faults could occur at different segments of the memory address space. Faults in the
Text segment are relatively easy to detect. An illegal instruction or a Bus error is easily
caught by the Operating System and signaled to the application.
Data errors, i.e. errors in the static or dynamic data segments are more difficult to detect,
unless the address of a variable is modified to an illegal address or to an address that ex-
ceeds the allocated segment boundaries. Thus any bit flip that mutates data to another legal
data is not detected by the Operating System. Therefore applications that reside in an envi-
ronment that is prone to such faults in memory (described earlier) resort to additional fault
tolerance techniques or error detection mechanisms. Popular fault tolerance techniques
include introducing hardware and software redundancies like n-version programming and
voting mechanisms. However redundancies add to overhead.
Application specific error detection mechanisms check the logical correctness of ex-
ecution state based on application specific knowledge. Numerical Result checking is a
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popular algorithm based error detection mechanism, which can be applied to applications
performing numerical computations. This approach has the distinct advantage of being
more efficient than the original algorithm since it relies on post condition checks rather
than re-computing the result.
Wasserman and Blum [2] talk about the need for a Result checker to be time-bound in
Real-time systems, i.e the checker has to complete execution with a bounded time T(n).
While several fault tolerance mechanisms have been proposed for FFT[2-8], they study
gate level faults and concurrent error detection schemes. Not only is this at a lower ab-
straction than our interest, it requires special additional hardware for its implementation.
This is not a viable solution when the industry trend is towards COTS (commercial off-the-
shelf) components. Moreover they are specific to a fast algorithm while the error detection
mechanisms under our study can be applied to any Fourier transformation independent of
the underlying fast algorithm.
Redinbo [9] suggests a generic numeric expression for Unitary transformations that
could be used to detect errors in FFT. They suggest error detection based on comparing two
parity values, one computed by the weighted sum of the transform coefficients and the other
from a weighted sum of the input data. While this is an approach similar to the EDMs we
are evaluating, an implementation and detailed analysis of its coverage, performance etc.
has not been done yet. [1] has implemented their algorithm and measured its coverage by
randomly injected bit flips at random stages of the FFT computation. However a detailed
study of the performance of this algorithm under varying vector sizes and for faults injected
at each bit and at each stage of the FFT computation has not been done.
It is interesting to study the behavior of faults at each stage of the FFT algorithm as well
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as the coverage of each error detection mechanism under such faults. This is because a fault
at a given bit at stage x might have a distinct effect from a fault at the same bit at stage x+k.
While theoretical expressions for the error propagation through the various stages in FFT
have been derived [27], an implementation and a practical study of this phenomenon and
its effect on various EDMs has not been done.
Finally we propose to study the behavior of these EDMs under a set of worst-case inputs
containing members that are zero or near zero with a few elements that are of extremely
large magnitudes leading to catastrophic-cancellations. The behavior of each of the EDMS
when subjected to such adverse inputs is studied. [22] introduced the concept of Algorithm
Based Fault Tolerance using check-sums for systolic arrays. [23] compares Algorithm
based fault tolerance with Result checking for Matrix operations like Matrix multiplication,
QR decomposition, Matrix Inversion,etc. [24] suggests the idea of stored-randomness and
pre-computing in order to reduce the run-time overhead. [25] discusses the advantages
of inserting run-time result checkers in embedded Information systems. [28] introduces
algorithm-based fault tolerance for FFT processors, but again requires additional hardware
for its implementation.
Various fault injection mechanisms have been proposed, where faults are either in-
jected into the hardware or faults are simulated using software mechanisms[12]. Earlier
fault-injection mechanisms were primarily hardware fault injections where additional hard-
ware was used to inject faults. MESSALINE, is one such general pin-level fault injection
tool[13]. FIAT injects transient faults into a chip using heavy ion radiation[14]. However,
in recent years software fault injection techniques have been gaining popularity. This is
because they provide more precise control over location and timing of faults and require no
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additional hardware. Software mechanisms emulate hardware memory or communication
faults using software. We shall use software mechanisms to inject all faults because they
offer better control from an application-level point of view. The evolution of software fault
injection mechanisms is discussed in detail in the following section.
2.3 Software Fault Injection Mechanisms
2.3.1 Fault Injection approaches
Faults can be injected into an application pre-run time, where the application is modified
before it is loaded or at run-time where a fault injection mechanism injects faults, while
the application is executing. Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages.
In pre-run time fault injection, the source code or assembly-level or machine-level code
is modified. Thus pre-run time fault-injection, requires the application to be re-compiled
and/or re-loaded every time fault parameters are changed and also requires modification
of the application code. Another disadvantage of this approach is that faults cannot be
specified while the application is executing. In run-time fault injection, it is possible to
inject faults at certain time offsets of application execution, thus giving the user control
of the precise instant of fault injection. However, this fault injection mechanism can be
intrusive to the application execution, affecting the application’s run-time behavior.
2.3.2 Memory model
FERRARI[15] emulates faults in data line, address line, CPU and memory - a fairly low
level of abstraction. Effects of faults in the CPU including faults in data registers, address
registers, ALU, etc are highly dependent on the processor architecture.
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Ours is a flattened view of memory as opposed to the hierarchical memory model con-
sisting of cache, main memory, etc. This model is architecture-independent. We have
adopted the address space memory model in our study, because we are primarily interested
in fault injection at an application-level perspective. Also, faults in the virtual address space
indirectly emulate the above mentioned low-level faults, for example, a faulty address could
be because of a faulty register, or faulty memory cell or faulty address/data line in the bus.
Note that in FERRARI, faults are injected at run-time by trapping program execution at
specified instructions or by timers(This approach has the disadvantage of being intrusive to
program execution.)[15]. Faults are injected by modifying instruction or memory
2.3.3 Related work in fault injection
DOCTOR, has a similar approach as ours, injecting faults into the process address space but
on a real-time distributed environment called HARTS[16]. However, like most real-time
systems, HARTS does not employ memory protection. Thus additional challenges in our
mechanism include modifying protected memory segments like the text segment and deal-
ing with the possibility of the fault injector causing page faults and thereby altering the nat-
ural flow of execution of the program1. In DOCTOR, communication faults are injected by
intercepting send/receive operations and changing message contents. In contrast, our tool
supports the distributed object environment of CORBA, where communication is essen-
tially through remote object calls with input, output and inout parameters. Fault-injection
is therefore done at a much higher-level of abstraction than in DOCTOR. FIAT is another
such real-time fault injection tool injecting faults into memory as well messages[13]. In
1Real time systems pre-allocate memory in order to avoid page faults
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DOCTOR communication faults are injected by intercepting send/receive operations and
changing message contents[16]. Work has been done on fault injection at the Operating-
system and middle-ware level. FINE is a fault injection mechanism that injects faults into
the UNIX operating system (as opposed to applications, which is our area of study) and
observes the system behavior[17]. Similarly, Chung et.al[18] have studied the fault injec-
tion and behavior of popular CORBA and DCOM implementations on the NT platform
while Orchestra[19] corrupts messages to test dependability of communication protocols.
FTAPE injects faults into memory, the target here is the processor[18]. A synthetic work-
load generator creates high-stress conditions for the processor and the performance of the
processor in the faulty environment is studied. GOOFI injects pin-level and pre-run time
faults(i.e. faults are injected before the application starts to execute)into memory[21].
Some and Kim et al. have injected single bit memory faults into an FFT application
and found that heap is most significant for their application, as it occupied a majority of
the application memory[20]. ESFFI injects faults into COTS(Commercial off-the-shelf)
components, by trapping specified instructions and injecting faults(disadvantage of being
intrusive)[21].
The objective of our fault-injection tool is to support the distributed object environment
of CORBA on a unix-based platform, injecting both memory and communication faults
into applications at run-time.The mechanism is as non-intrusive to application execution as
possible and allows the user to specify faults pre-run time(but post-compile time)as well
as at run time(via API calls). The tool allows the user a wide range of choices on fault
location, model and timing. Our fault-injection mechanism is described in detail in the
following section.
10
CHAPTER III
FAULT INJECTOR
In this chapter we discuss the features of our fault injector and various types and conditions
of faults that can be specified for injection. We also describe the strategy adopted to make
it as non-intrusive as possible.
The fault injection mechanism by our tool is primarily run-time fault injection, where
the user can specify faults both pre- and post-compile time. The tool henceforth referred
to as FIMA (Fault Injector for Middleware Applications) is capable of injecting memory
and communication faults for distributed applications. The fault injector is a thread that
attaches itself to the main application process, wakes up at the specified time of fault injec-
tion and injects faults into memory, does some fault-queue management and mostly sleeps
otherwise. This considerably reduces intrusion into the run-time behavior of the applica-
tion. The fault injector is an event driven entity where events constitute specified faults to
be injected, remote method invocations and any communication from the main application
via API calls. For every remote method invocation, the fault injector has to wake up and
update its untimed queues that store faults based on method invocation count.
The event driven mechanism is realized by utilizing system timers in the real-time li-
brary. Solaris offers both wall-clock as well as process-execution time based timers. A
timer expiration results in the receipt of the signal SIGALRM and the timer id of the timer
that has just expired. The signal handler determines if the timerid is one of FIMA fault
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timers. If yes, it wakes up the FIMA thread.
The user also has the option of specifying faults to be temporally dependent on in-
struction execution. This is made available to the user via API (Application programmer
interface) calls, and requires source modification and application compilation. Thus the
fault actually gets specified at run-time and can have run-time dependencies, such as inject
fault on the F (+* invocation of a method, or inject fault if a condition is true. This allows for
a very precise control of the location of faults like data variables etc, which is useful for
our experiments.
Memory fault injection is done by flipping, setting or resetting bits at the specified
location in the address space i.e text space, static data space, heap or stack. In order to
make sure the fault injection thread does not cause page faults, thereby altering application
run-time behavior, the fault injector checks to make sure the page containing fault location
is in fact existing in main-memory. If not, the fault is not injected, and this is appropriately
logged.
Also, since the fault-injector is a thread and shares its address space with the application
process, we must restrain the fault-injector from corrupting its own code or data space. This
is addressed in the following way. The fault Injector code resides as a library that needs to
be linked in with the application object file. By compiling the library as a shared library that
gets linked only at run-time, we ensure that the Fault Injector code and data resides in the
section of the address space that is allocated for shared libraries: between the upper limit of
the heap and the lower limit of the stack. Since our Fault Injection tool constantly checks
the dynamic data limits to ensure faults are not injected in this region, we thus restrain the
fault injector from corrupting itself.
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3.1 Run time overhead
In a multi-processor machine the fault injector could be bound to a light-weight process
which would totally eliminate any run-time overhead on the main application. In order to
determine the run-time overhead of the fault injector on the application, we consider its
execution on a single processor machine. A cpu-intensive application is a good application
example for evaluating this, since it competes with the fault injector for CPU resources.
This is true for all threads that are unbounded, i.e. they have a process contention scope.
This means they compete with other threads within the process for getting scheduled. While
having the thread bound to a light-weight process eliminates its contention with the main
application for getting scheduled, a thread switch now also involves a light-weight process
switch in a single-processor machine. This is obviously more expensive than a simple
thread switch in the unbound thread case. We therefore do not bind our fault injector to any
light-weight process.
It is also important to understand the scheduling policies of the operating system. Time-
sharing (TS), which is the default scheduling policy in Solaris, is not a real-time scheduling
policy and the scheduler dynamically changes the priority of processes/threads based on
the process activity. A process that sleeps or yields quickly is considered to be highly
interactive and the scheduler therefore increases its priority. A cpu-bound process/thread
is pushed down in priority. There is no bounded behavior for such a scheduling policy.
In real-time scheduling, we have FIFO and Round-Robin where there is bounded time
within which a thread will be scheduled. The scheduler does not dynamically alter the
process priority. However setting the scheduler to real-time would require root access since
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real-time scheduling priority is considered higher than time-sharing (which is the default
scheduling policy of the process). The fault injector thread would have to relinquish its
allocated cpu-time through an explicit call to yield during its idle time.
In making the thread event driven, we instead determine when it will be scheduled and
avoid being scheduled during idle time and making explicit calls to sched-yield, involving
unnecessary thread-switches. The fault injector thread essentially blocks on a mutex con-
dition variable during idle time. Before this, it sets the system timers to fault injection time
of the fault in the queues’ head (Fault queues are sorted based on fault injection time). Any
event like the expiry of a timer, an API call from the main application or a remote method
invocation results in a call to signal the condition variable and the system wakes up the fault
injector thread. This mechanism thus involves considerable thread synchronization using
mutexes and avoiding race conditions.
In order to determine the run-time overhead of the fault injector, we consider its execu-
tion on a single processor machine. We choose the FF result checking application which is
a CPU-intensive application.
We baseline the application execution time without the fault injector attached to it. We
then attach the Fault injector but run it with no faults specified and measure the execution
overhead. Finally we run a set of experiments with single and multiple faults injected.
Multiple faults are injected at the rate of one every 0.04 secs which results in around 3-4
faults being injected per run.
Note that these set of readings exclude the initialization time required by the FIMA
thread to initialize its data structures. CPU times shown below represent the average ex-
ecution time from 100 runs. CPU time represents the sum of CPU times of the main
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application and the fault injector thread. We observe that execution time of the application
with FIMA thread under no faults is almost equal to its execution time without the FIMA
thread. This is because in the absence of faults, the FIMA thread essentially sleeps.
In the above described experiments, faults have been specified interms of offsets from
the address space. For such faults, the fault injector determines the dynamic address space
limits before injecting the specified fault. This is not done for faults specified as offsets
from static address segments. Thus faults in these experiments represent a worst-case per
fault overhead.
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Figure 1: FIMA execution overhead: Compares execution times of application in the
absence of FIMA thread, with FIMA thread but no faults, Single fault injected per run,
multiple faults at faults every 0.04 secs. and with a 1000 faults specified in future and only
one fault being active(i.e only 1 fault gets injected)
The last bar in the graph represents a 1000 faults specified in the Fault specification
file, out of which only one is active. Note that the 1000 static faults have not caused an
overhead on the execution. This is because the fault queues are time sorted and the FIMA
thread only checks the head of the queue, rather than parsing through the entire queue.
We now evaluate the initialization overhead of the fault injector thread. For this again,
we measure the cpu-time for the FIMA thread to initialize and return. This overhead is
independent of the application execution time. The only variable component in this over-
head could be the size of the fault specification file. Thus we have below the average
cpu-overhead from 100 runs, when run with no faults specified and the size of fault specifi-
cation file is the minimum possible with 200 memory and communication faults and finally
with a 1000 memory and communication faults. The average per fault overhead at startup
is approximately 16 micro-seconds.
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We see that FIMA has a minimum initialization overhead of HGI"-&$&- . The API calls
that specify a fault were found to take around 0.322 milli-secs per fault (averaged over a
hundred runs) in the absence of static faults. With a 1000 faults specified in the queues (500
memory faults with the same time unit as the API calls), the average time for the API calls
was 0.339 mill-seconds per fault. This is important, because the API call involves sorting
through the queue to find the appropriate position to insert. Our API calls were such that
their start time was greater then the start times of all the statically specified faults. This
means, the API call has to search through the entire queue before inserting the fault each
time.
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Figure 2: FIMA initialization overhead: With an empty Fault spcecification file, 200 static
faults and 1000 static faults
3.2 Memory limits
The fault injector has to inject faults only within allocated memory limits to avoid causing
page faults thereby altering the natural execution flow of the main application. In order to
do this it is necessary to determine the address limits of the various segments of the address
space. Static limits like the text segment and static data segment can be obtained from the
executable. GNU utility objdump parses the executable and determines the static address
limits.
Dynamic limits are obtained at run time using the /proc filesystem in Solaris. The /proc
file system stores a copy of the virtual address space of each executing process. Dynamic
memory limits like the heap and stack limits are obtained at run-time by reading from this
filesystem.
If the user specifies a memory location for fault injection that is outside these limits, an
18
error is logged and the fault is not injected.
19
CHAPTER IV
EFFECTS OF FAULTS
In this chapter we present the possible effects of faults in the various segments in the address
space. Faults in each of the address segments can result in different behaviors of the same
application. Faults can lead to the application crashing, can lead to errors in the outputs of
the application or can be latent and not affect the execution of the application at all.
4.1 Faults in the text segment
The various possible effects of faults in the text segment can be summarized as follows:
 Illegal instruction
(Application crash) valid but incorrect instruction
      (latent)
Un−executed instruction
Incorrect data           Incorrect control flow                    System trap                                                                                                                         ld/st instr. addr.
mal−aligned 
addr.(Bus error)
 segv
            (may or may not be detected)                          (eg. Priviledged opcode)
Faults in text segment
Figure 3: Faults in text segment
Faults in the code segment can lead to the execution of an illegal or malformed in-
struction, causing the operating system to raise an exception of Illegal Instruction causing
the application to crash. The fault could mutate the code in such a way that the modified
instruction is a legal instruction. This could result in the instruction executing and giving
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incorrect results, thereby corrupting data or the mutated instruction could cause an incor-
rect branching operation, altering the application control flow. If the mutated instruction is
now a privileged opcode, it will result in the operating system raising an exception and the
application crashing. Faults in the text segment could also modify a load/store instruction
and the address offsets in the operands get modified in such a way, that the application tries
to access an un-aligned address, causing the system to throw an exception of Bus-error or
an illegal address is accessed causing the system to throw an exception of Segment Viola-
tion. If the address gets modified to a valid but incorrect address, then this could result in
incorrect data flow and/or incorrect results. The fault could also be latent in nature, where
the modified instruction never gets executed.
Thus we see that in most cases, a fault in the text segment that manifests into an error
is caught by the Operating System.
4.2 Faults in the data segment
The various possible effects of faults in the data segment are summarized below:
Faults in the data segment
                                address
incorrect data       mal−aligned    illegal address
                                                 (pointer variable)               (latent)                         (control flow)
               Incorrect results        Incorrect address        un−accessed data       Incorrect branching
Figure 4: Faults in data segment
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The immediate impact of a fault in the data segment could be incorrect results be-
cause of reading corrupted data. A data fault could also cause an incorrect branching and
thereby modify control flow, if data is mutated such that it affects the result of a branching
instruction. It is also possible that the corrupted data is never subsequently read or gets
over-written and there by the fault remains latent. The fault could also corrupt an address
value if the fault affects a pointer variable. When the contents of a pointer variable are cor-
rupted, i.e. it now points to an incorrect address; the new address could be a valid address
(and therefore causes the application to access wrong data) or it could be a mal-aligned ad-
dress, causing the operating system generate a signal (Bus error) when the application tries
to access the contents of the pointer variable. It is also possible that the modified contents
of the pointer variable is an illegal address, i.e. an address the application does not have
read/write permissions to or an address that is not mapped to the application process.
4.3 Heap and Stack faults
4.3.1 Stack faults
Faults in the stack have a high probability of subsequent reads and therefore more likely to
affect program execution than any other types of faults. Stack faults can either cause data
corruption or they can alter the program control flow by corrupting the stack trace. Thus
faults in the stack could either behave as data faults or code faults that cause incorrect con-
trol flow or application crash (because of segmentation violation, bus error). It is expected
that control-oriented applications, would have higher stack traces at any point of execution,
as compared to I/O-intensive applications, and therefore a higher probability of error due
to such faults.
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4.3.1.1 Heap faults
Faults in the heap might possibly have a higher impact on data intensive applications be-
cause of their larger heap and stack size. On the other hand, larger heap size could mean
a larger area for faults to be scattered and therefore lower impact, depending on how the
heap is accessed by the program after fault injection.
Thus we see that data errors are most difficult to detect and most errors in the text
segment are detected by the in-built error detection mechanisms of the Operating System.
Applications that are prone to such faults therefore have to rely on additional error-detection
mechanisms.
Thus we see that data errors are difficult to detect. Moreover the FFT computation
application usually stores its input and output vectors as dynamically allocated data. Since
our application is most prone to faults in the heap, our set of experiments involve injecting
faults into the heap of the application.
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CHAPTER V
NUMERICAL RESULT CHECKING APPROACHES
In this chapter we introduce the three numerical result checking algorithms and present
their mathematical proofs.
The post-condition to be satisfied by any DFT computation is:
JLKNM : 
where  is the POQ input vector; M is the POR DFT transform matrix; J is the SOQ
output vector
Taking into account the round-off errors due to computation, the post-condition check be-
comes:
 J > M : TVUXW
where v is some invariant that accounts for round-off errors introduced in the computa-
tion.
We observe that W is a n-length vector and any numerical result checking involves compar-
ing of two scalar values. In order to reduce this expression to a scalar, a probe vector w is
introduced[1].
  :  J > M : TYUZ (1)
where [5   W We refer to  as the threshold representing the difference in the post-
condition check.
24
5.1 EDM 1
EDM 1 is a generic solution that checks for the computational correctness of a linear map-
ping 3N\] !4^ ]Q_ , where ] is a field( ` , a , or any other infinite of finite field). Described
below is its application to the specific problem of checking the correctness for FFT com-
putations.
Let P5b dc   c feGGgGgGh !  c fijk` be input data.
Then ]l]nmo=T5 J 5b J dc J  c GgGGgG J !  cCpq jsrn!
Thus we have a mapping
]4]Qm/\t ! ^ r !
This mapping will be treated as the mapping 3 in the preceding discussion.
Now, according to the suggested method, we have to chose a linear mapping
u \)r ! ^ `
Since rQ! as a linear space over ` is isomorphic to `  ! , a mapping u is specified by a
vector vR5wv xc GgGgGGyv  ! 
for J 5b J dc GgGGgGgG c J ! z5{;| ~}Adc GGgGGgGy| !}	! Yjsrn! as:
u  J 5v  | } vx A} ved|  } v   } GGgGGgGgGGyv  !01 | !R} v  !&	!
Now, we have to define the mapping r\`! ^ ` as the composition of FFT and the
mapping
u
.
Let  xc   c GGgGGI ! be the basis vectors in `! .
We have
  5b c  c  c  c GgGGgGI& c   5w c  c  c  c GgGGgGI& c GgGGgGgGGgGGgG c  ! 5b c  c  c  c GGgGgGI)
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Any vector S5{ xc   c feGgGGgGh !  c fijk` can be expressed as P5 !+  
  
To define r it is sufficient to define numbers r   for F5{ c  c GGgGGh . r=T65r !+  
   z5
!+  
 r   Say FFT ;  5  5b   c 

 c GgGGgGgGI

 !  Then r  5b;

 v } GgGGgGgGI

 ! v  ! Yjs`
Denote r;   as r 
Using these notations we obtain rT65    r  js`
Thus the check for correctness in FFT computations is r=Tz5    r  js`Z5 u  J 
Allowing for round-off errors this expression becomes:
u  J >   r  js`UX
where
u  J  is as derived before : u  J 5v  | 	} vx A1} vded|  } v   } GgGGgGGgGgGIv  !01 | !z}
v  !&	! and  is a variate that is determined by observing the round-off errors in our experi-
ment runs.
5.1.1 Mathematical Proof
Expression
u  J >    r  js`5X
can be expressed as
u  J 5tQ J Gy3 8 
where 3[5wv }? v  c vde }? v c GgGGgGIv  !D01~} v  ! 
FFT(  ) = : where  is the OY FFT transform matrix and 5b1 c   c GgGGgGy)!" :
Now applying the same transformation to FFT(  ) we have:
u ;]l]Qm¡=TC5tQ=~GIL:¢Gy3z8d
If  is real, this reduces to:
u ;]l]Qm¡=TC57tQ : Gh39 8 
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~GytQ"£
	G¤v }? v  c ve } v c GgGGgGgGGgGGgGgGIv ¢} v  !01c v ~} v  ! 8
  G¤v }? v  c ve } v c GgGGgGgGGgGGgGgGIv ¢} v  !01c v ~} v  ! 8
G
G
 ! G¤v }? v  c ve } v c GgGGgGgGGgGGgGgGIv ¢} v  !01xc v } v  !  8¥
We observe that ;  xG;v }? v  c ve }? v c GGgGgGGgGGgGgGGyv ¢}? v  !01dc v }? v  ! ¦8
is infact r  and the above expression reduces to :
u ;]l]nmoT¦5/   r  js`
Now taking a step back and assuming  is complex we have:
u ;]l]nmoT¦5tQ~Gy§Gh39 8 65tQ=TxGytQ;§Gh39 8 ¨>[©ªTxGh©ª;§Gh39 8 
Re ;«Gy3 8  has already been represented as r  . Im ;§Gh39 8  can be represented as ¬  :
¬  5{>l¦   v  } 

 v ~} >l¦
e v }   veGGgGgGGgG¤­>4¦  !01 v  !} 

 ! v  !01
Thus we have,
u  J  K  tQ  r  ¨>  ©ª=  ¬  
We can see that this involves '&  }  D multiplies in all. Elements of the sets r  and
¬  can be computed offline. This reduces the number of multiplies to '& ”online” real
multiplies. If x is real, then this reduces even further to  D ”online” multiplies.
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5.2 EDM 2
Turmon et.al. [1] present an approach where the probe vector not only reduces the left-
hand and right-hand sides to a scalar value, but also considerably reduces the number of
computations involved. This becomes evident when we express Equation 1 as
  : J >   : M : P57
Evaluating  J : involves  multiplies and evaluating  QM :1	: involves   }  complex
multiplies. Thus the total number of real multiplies involved are -"  }7®  (assuming 1
complex multiply = 4 real multiplies). The component  9M : can be computed offline as
it is independent of the input vector. This reduces the number of ”online” multiplies to ® 
real multiplies.
Turmon et.al go on to define a check for d :
 ¯B	  z        65°D± (2)
Where ° is an input-independent threshold
± is  ²GI LOL01³ and    is the vector two-norm of  and 5   : J >  QM :1 and  
represents the magnitude of the complex scalar  . We represent °D± as  .
The scaling by the matrix size results in an input independent threshold value. We shall
refer to this algorithm as EDM 2. To determine  , we run a series of experiments under
fault-free conditions. This is discussed in the following section.
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5.3 EDM 3
Another applicable error detection algorithm is based on Parseval’s theorem which we shall
refer to as EDM 3. EDM3 exploits the fact that the energy content of a waveform remains
constant across a Fourier Transformation. In fact, this is true for all unitary transformations,
i.e. where the transform matrix is a unitary matrix. ( 3¡01Q5´398 ) as this property ensures
energy conservation. Therefore, for Fourier Transform we have:
 J   5¶µ ·  
We thus have a post-condition check
d J   >¸µ ·   CBf   K 
Evaluating this condition incolves   online multiplies.
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CHAPTER VI
CHARACTERISTICS OF ERROR DETECTION
MECHANISMS FOR FFT
In this chapter we define and describe the various characteristics that are important for an
Error Detection Mechanism. We also compare these characteristics for the three EDMs.
6.1 Execution Time
Execution time is important for any error detection algorithm. The result checker should
involve minimal numerical computations and must take as little time for execution as pos-
sible. Obviously the result checker must execute faster than the original FFT computing
application.
Looking at the algorithms described above, it can be seen that EDM 3 is most numeri-
cally efficient. Next is EDM 1 as it involves '& online real multiplies in the complex case
and   real multiplies when the input is real. EDM 2 is most computationally intensive
involving ®  online real multiplies.
Below is a plot of the execution time in our implementation for each of these algorithms
with varying vector sizes. Assumption is that the transform matrices and the probe vectors
can be computed a priori offline. Therefore their computation time is excluded from the
results:
Thus we see that as the vector length increases, the difference between the execution
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Figure 5: Execution times of the 3 EDMs for Complex input as vector length is varied
times of the three EDMs becomes more significant. We also observe that the execution
times increase linearly with vector size(notice our x-axis is logarithmic).
In EDM 1, the number of online computations are reduced to half incase the input is
real. Therefore it is interesting to compare the execution times in such a case. The plot
below demonstrates this.
We observe that for real inputs, EDM 1 performs much better and has an execution time
closer to EDM 3.
One is tempted to consider EDM 3 as an ideal choice. However, it is important to note
that errors in sign bits are not detected by this algorithm. Errors in the sign bit mutate data
in such a way that the magnitude of the data variable and thus the entropy of the signal
remain unchanged. Therefore such errors in the input or output are not detected by this
test. Errors in the sign bit are the most significant errors and cannot go undetected.
This leads to the other important characteristic of an error detection mechanism : its
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Figure 6: Execution times of the 3 EDMs for real input as vector length is varied
coverage. Coverage is defined as the probability of detecting a fault under a given fault
probability distribution. Coverage can be estimated by the fraction of faults that are de-
tected in a random sample of injected faults from the given distribution. In order for the
error detection algorithm to detect maximum faults, it should have a high degree of sensi-
tivity to faults. This implies that faults injected in the lower order bits must generate a high
enough perturbation in  so that they are detected.
In order to compare the error coverage of the three error detection mechanisms, we
shall subject our test application to faults in each of the 64 bit representation at a random
element of its data vector at various stages of the FFT computation and evaluate coverage
by each mechanism.
6.2 Round off errors and Vector length
We study the variation of the difference in the post-condition check,  that represents the
round-off errors, for varying vector length for all the three error detection mechanisms.
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Figure 7:  for varying vector length for EDM 1
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Figure 8:  for varying vector length for EDM 2
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Figure 9:  for varying vector length for EDM 3
We observe that  for both EDM 1 and EDM 2 varies almost linearly with vector length
while for EDM 3 this is a less strict relation.
We need to identify a suitable scaling for  in order to make it independent of the input.
We present analysis for EDM 1, although this can be used for the EDM 2 as well. We first
divide  by the length of the vector and observe its variation with input vector size.
From Fig. -HGI- There is a variation with input vector size. So we further divide this
difference by    where n is the vector size.
We observe that there is still a variation that is not constant over vector length(Fig.
-HGI¹ ). We next divide this value with the norms of the input vector and the mapping vector,
in order to make it independent of their magnitudes.
We see that this variation has a decreasing value with increasing vector size, which is
to our advantage as it allows a tighter setting of thresholds(Fig. -HG ® ) Finally, we observe the
variation of the difference when the difference is scaled by the square root of the product
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Figure 10:  scaled by the vector length for varying vector length
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Figure 11:  scaled by the product of vector length and its log to the base 2 for varying
vector length
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Figure 12: Magnitude of the difference in post-condition check scaled by     for varying vector length
of the two norms.
From Fig. -HGyº we observe that this is has a somewhat erratic behavior for vector sizes
smaller than 256 although it becomes constant for larger vector sizes.
We observe that dividing the difference by the product of the square roots of the two
norms in addition to A gives us the lowest possible thresholds.
Note that, this scaling is important only for setting thresholds so that we have thresh-
olds independent of input vector magnitudes and length. Since we be divide both sides of
our post-condition checks with the same scaling, we will not bias our round-off errors in
anyway.
We thus adopt the product of vector length, norm of the input vector and norm of the
mapping vector   as our scaling of choice. We shall denote this scaled difference in the
post-condition check as delta.
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Figure 13: Magnitude of the difference in post-condition check scaled by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6.3 Threshold values
An important step in implementing these error detection mechanisms is choosing a thresh-
old value. Ideally, the threshold value must be independent of the vector length. In section
-HGI we determined a scaling for threshold values of EDM2 to make it independent of vector
length. In this section we discuss the setting of threshold values and also study its variation
with vector length for all EDMs.
Setting a threshold too low would mean a high false-alarm rate. A false alarm is when
the error detection mechanism mistakes the round off error for a fault. The threshold must
be chosen to be appropriately high to avoid false alarms at the same time low enough to
detect as many faults as possible. It is required that the error detection mechanism has a
high detection rate and low false alarm rate. In order for this to be true, the magnitude
of

should not vary heavily from one run to another. A small variation in

across runs
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enables us to set a low enough threshold. Lower thresholds would thus enable us to detect
smaller variations in

under faults and hence result in better coverage. In the following
experiments we shall evaluate the variation of the threshold values in various runs. Setting
of the threshold values is thus a compromise between high degree of error detection and
low false alarm rate.
Finally it is required that the tolerances suggested by the error detection mechanisms
be independent of the input vector length.
We have the following results for each error detection algorithm with varying vector
length.
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Figure 14: Threshold values under fault-free with varying vector length
We see that the thresholds are quite independent of vector length. Of the three, we
see that EDM 1 has the minimum deviation across varying vector lengths. Next comes
the EDM 2 followed by EDM 3. Moreover we see that as the vector length increases, the
thresholds decrease for EDM 1 and EDM 2 where as for EDM 3 this increases.
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Figure 15: Threshold values under fault-free with varying vector length
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Figure 16: Threshold values under fault-free with varying vector length
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A decreasing threshold value suggests better error detection if the threshold is re-
adjusted for larger vector sizes. For EDM 3 the threshold value will have to be increased
for larger vector sizes in order to avoid false alarms. This also means a decrease in error
detection probability.
6.4 Relation between Threshold values and round-off errors
In this section, we evaluate the round-off errors in the FFT computation for our system. We
then present the relation between this and the delta values we observed.
In order to compute the round-off errors inherent in our system that computes the FFT
we proceed as follows:
Let  be the input vector and » be the FFT(x) computed by our system.
Then ¼>½©]4]Qmo» represents the total round-off error in the computation of FFT of
x and its inverse FFT. (IFFT(X) represents the inverse FFT of X.) Assuming the worst-
case that the round-off errors are cumulative, we approximate the round-off error in the
computation of FFT as =¼>[©]4]Qmo»¦CB& .
For vector lengths of 64, this round-off error was found to be of the order of 101 e . The
worst case round-off was found to be of the order of 	01  .For our sets of input, the input
has a range of  e in magnitude and hence a norm of the same order. When the round-
off error ²01  is divided by the norm of the input and the norm of our   vector (fixed at
the order of " ) we get a threshold of the order of  01;¾ . This is in agreement with the
worst-case threshold obtained for the EDMs.
For a higher dynamic data range of ¾ in magnitude, the round-off error was found to
be of the order of  012 . However, the norm of the input vector was also higher (of the
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order of  ¾  . resulting in a threshold value that is the same as before. Thus dividing the 
value by the norm of the input vector makes it independent of the magnitude of the input.
When the vector length was increased to 256, the round-off error was still at the order
of 01  , showing that the round-off errors are not cumulative and tend to cancel out on an
average case. Scaling  by the vector length is thus a worst-case measure.
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CHAPTER VII
EXPERIMENTAL RUNS
7.1 Experimental Setup
7.1.1 Setting of thresholds
In order to understand the behavior of the round-off errors, we first run a set of exper-
iments under fault-free conditions and observer

. We run each EDM under fault-free
conditions for 1,000,000 runs for randomly generated vector inputs of length 64. The in-
puts are generated such that the real and imaginary parts have a gaussian distribution with
unit variance. The input has a dynamic data range in terms of magnitude of  e . The
data however has a variation up to the 15 (+* decimal place. Thus the data varies from 0 to
1000.999999999999999. Thus, looking at the just the numbers involved (discarding the
decimal point) we have a variation in data from  to H
 . In that sense the data has a vari-
ation of ²
 Table ¹²G below lists the standard deviation of the  values under fault-free
conditions for each of the EDMs.
We see that

under ¿oPÀÁ has the minimum variance across the 1,000,000 runs while
¿o¼À$ has the maximum variance. Table ¹²GI below illustrates the maximum value of

obtained for each of the EDMS in the 1,000,000 runs. This represents the worst-case
EDM 2 EDM 3 ¿oPÀ{8 ¿oPÀ{88 ¿o¼À{888 ¿oPÀÁ
1.1143e-17 1.5752e-16 1.3995e-09 2.1867e-11 3.6445e-12 3.2264e-18
Table 1: Standard deviation of

under fault free conditions : ¿4PÀ{D8 represents  for¿o¼À{ ; ¿4PÀ{88 is 1B ; ¿oPÀ{888 is 1B" ; ¿o¼À{ is fBA·    
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EDM 2 EDM 3 ¿oPÀ{8 ¿oPÀ{88 ¿o¼À{888 ¿oPÀÁ
8.5805e-17 1.1405e-15 1.3504e-08 2.1100e-10 3.5167e-11 2.7883e-17
Table 2: Maximum value of

under fault free conditions
EDM 2 EDM 3 ¿oPÀ{8 ¿oPÀ{88 ¿o¼À{888 ¿oPÀÁ
2.1504e-17 1.8202e-16 1.8348e-09 2.8669e-11 4.7782e-12 4.2541e-18
Table 3: Mean value of

under fault free conditions
round-off errors:
Table ¹GI$ illustrates the mean value of  obtained for each of the EDMS in the 1,000,000
runs. This represents the average-case round-off errors:
We set our thresholds based on the maximum value of the round-off errors. In our ex-
periments, the threshold has been set as &Â above the maximum value of  from 1,000,000
different runs of randomly generated input vectors under fault free conditions.
7.1.2 Choice of   vector
EDM 1, involves the product §Gh39·8 which is equivalent to computing the FFT of the  
vector. Similarly EDM 2 involves computing the product  QM : which is the FFT of the w
vector. Therefore it is important that the   vector not have an FFT that is sparse in order
to ensure that none of the elements of the input or output vector get zeroed out. This auto-
matically eliminates the simplest mapping: a vector of all 1s or its multiples. We therefore
construct a   vector whose real and imaginary elements have a normal distribution with
unit variance. This ensures that the elements of   and its Fourier transform do not vary sig-
nificantly in magnitude and therefore all elements of the vectors under scrutiny get weighed
somewhat equivalently.
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0 1-11 12-63
Sign Exponent Significand
Table 4: IEEE representation of Double precision numbers
7.1.3 Input Vectors and Error Analysis
The input vectors are randomly generated based on a normal distribution with unit variance.
The data is generated such that it has a dynamic deviation of  e in magnitude of its whole
number portion and a dynamic range of H
 in all.
We run our experiments for a million runs each. For a sufficiently large sample size n,
the measured probability of detection Ã has approximately a normal distribution[29]. The
standard error of the probability estimate Ã is given by  Ã¢R>kÃ¦B where ÃÅÄÆ and
­>ÃYÄN [30]. Thus for all probabilities greater than 0.00001 or less than 0.99999 we
have a standard error that is less than 0.0005.
7.1.4 Fault Injection Experiments
The IEEE 64-bit representation of a Double-precision number is illustrated in Table ¹²Gh' .
The first bit is the sign bit followed by 11 bits of the exponent and finally 52 bits of the
significand. The double precision number is represented by: >lÇ } GIÈFAFF ÉxÊA (ÌË	Í 	O
 ÎÏ­ÐxÍ;!Î;!(¤012  e The sign bit and the exponent bits are therefore the most prominent bits. A
bit flip introduced in these bits leads to maximum mutation of data. Please see appendix A
for an illustration of the effects of bit flips in the magnitude of a data element.
The first set of our experiments are designed so as to evaluate the error coverage of all
the three error detection mechanisms. Faults are injected at each bit of the 64-bit represen-
tation of double precision vectors at randomly chosen vector elements. The fault injection
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is timed to occur at the beginning of the  stages of the FFT computation.
Since we are considering vectors of length 64, our coverage experiments constitute
injecting single bit flips at each of the 6 stages in the FFT computation.
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7.2 Experiment Runs
The first set of experiment runs are designed to evaluate the coverage of the EDMs. For
this we measure the number of detected faults in a million runs, with each of the 64 bits
being corrupted one by one. Bit flips are introduced at all the 6 stages of the 64-length FFT
computation into the data array. Faults at the input stage would fan out to all elements of
the FFT while single bit flips at the final stage might effect only two elements of the final
output. Thus we determine coverage for all stages of the FFT to study such cumulative
effects of faults.
7.2.1 Faults at input
We have the following observations of error detection for faults at the input stage. The
x-axis represents the number of the bit being flipped and the ordinate represents the proba-
bility of error detection. The probability of detection of an EDM is computed by measuring
the number of errors detected by the EDM in a million faulty runs divided by the number
of runs.
We see that errors in the Sign bit are not detected by EDM 3. Also, as bit flips start
getting less significant, the error detection capability of EDM 3 starts reducing first. EDM
2 and EDM 1 algorithms are very close to each other initially, but for bit flips at bit numbers
in the 50’s, EDM 1 is better. While EDM 3 does not detect all errors starting from bit 30,
its error detection capability reduces a lot slower than that of EDM 2, as the significance of
the injected faults reduces. We observe that EDM 1 has an overall error detection capability
that is better than the other two EDMs.
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Figure 17: Prob. of detection for faults at the input stage of FFT
7.2.2 Faults at various stages of FFT
Faults are injected at the intermediate stage of the FFT computation. Since ours is a 64
length vector, we have 6 stages. We corrupted data in the input stage, in the previous
section. We now inject faults at the inputs of stage  to stage - and finally the output of
stage - , which is also the output of the FFT.
We observe that the error detection probability does not vary considerably for faults
injected across the various stages of the FFT.A further discussion to explain this is carried
out in Section ¹²GI ²G ® .
7.2.3 Faults at random bits
This sets of experiments is geared towards evaluating the error detection capability of the
EDMs under real-life conditions where faults can occur randomly at any bit. Here we inject
faults at random bits of the data array at each of the 6 stages of the FFT.
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Figure 18: Prob. of detection for faults at the  "!Ñ# stage of FFT
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Figure 19: Prob. of detection for faults at the $ % # stage of FFT
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Figure 20: Prob. of detection for faults at the ')(+* stage of FFT
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Figure 21: Prob. of detection for faults at the ,"(+* stage of FFT
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Figure 22: Prob. of detection for faults at the - (+* stage of FFT
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Figure 23: Prob. of detection for faults at the output stage of FFT
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Figure 24: Prob. of detection for random bit flips, all faults included
We observe that EDM1 has a better error detection capability, followed by EDM 2(Fig.
¹²G ® ). Moreover, the error detection capability for random errors remains the same across
faults at various stages.
However under random bit flips there exist faults that are more severe than others and
error coverage is not a true measure of the error detection capability for such faults. For
example, faults in the Sign bit go undetected by EDM 3. When we measure the coverage,
a fault that goes undetected in the sign bit is treated equivalent to say a fault that goes
undetected in the -& !# bit. Therefore, in order to evaluate the true error detection capability
we exclude such small errors from our measure.
We run a set of million runs. For each of these runs, we introduce a random bit flip in the
data array. We then, determine if this error is a significant one. Since we are interested in
the effect of the bit flip rather then the bit-flip itself, we consider the significance of the error
introduced in the output. This is done by computing the FFT of the same input vector under
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fault-free conditions and determining if the difference between the two computed outputs
is significant. The set of experiments below discount all relative errors in the output that are
less than 012 from the coverage i.e. if y is the output element under fault-free conditions
and Y is the corresponding output element computed under faults, we consider only errors
that result in (y - Y )/y . 012 . The reason for choosing  012 is because this is reflective
of the round-off errors in the system.
It can be argued that this significant value of error can be chosen to be much greater,
and closer to the quantization noise in the system. This is because errors errors smaller
than the quantization noise are indistinguishable for the analog to digital signal converter.
In that case, assuming the level of quantization for our data range is of the order of   or
larger,
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Figure 25: Prob. of detection for random bit flips,for faults that lead to errors in computed
output .012
We see that for significant faults, both EDM 2 and EDM 1 have a prob. of detection
very close to 1. However EDM 3 performs poorly in comparison. The poor performance
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is mostly due to its inability to detect Sign bit faults. We observe that EDM 3 has a prob-
ability of detection less than the other two EDMs by approximately 0.02. This value can
be justified by arguing that faults greater than 	012 occur between bit 0 and around bit 44.
This means 1 in every 44 faults is not detected by EDM 3. This results in a probability of
not being detected of 0.02.
7.2.4 Special Cases
We now evaluate the performance of the EDMs under a set of worst-case inputs. Worst
case inputs from an error-detection perspective include input signals with all energy con-
centrated in one frequency bucket, or signals whose magnitude has a high peak at a time
instant and very low otherwise. For such signals, there is a high potential for catastrophic
cancellations. For instance when a very high value is added to an extremely small value,
the small value may be lost as a round-off error. Now when an equally high value is sub-
tracted again from this, this might cancel out the first high magnitude and the small value is
entirely lost. Thus the order of such computations contributes significantly to the round-off
errors.
Our experiments constitute generating such waveforms and evaluating the error detec-
tion capability of the three EDMs under these conditions.
7.2.5 Faults at input
We generate a set of inputs such that the vector consists of one or two values with magni-
tude greater than &Ò and the rest of the values around H0 e . Faults are injected at random
locations in the data array at the input stage. Faults here constitute random bit flips. The
error detection capabilities of the three EDMs is evaluated under a million runs. The graph
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below plots these values. An important consideration here is the understanding what mag-
nitude errors are significant. Since our data has a variation from 	0 e to "Ò , we have three
sets of probabilities with errors smaller than H0Ó , 0  , 0 e discounted respectively.
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Figure 26: Prob. of detection under worst case inputs, faults at input stage
7.2.6 Faults at output
Here we are interested in a set of inputs where the energy content is extremely high in
one frequency bucket. For this we generate inputs whose Fourier Transform has a singly
extremely high magnitude with the rest of the magnitudes being very low. Experiments
constitute of generating such vectors and taking their inverse Fourier Transform. Faults are
then injected at the output stage of the FFT.
The graphs below demonstrate the error detection capabilities under such conditions.
We observe that the error detection capability is reduced considerably under these set of
inputs. EDM 1 performs better among the three where as EDM 3 performs the worst in
both cases.
54
errors>10e-05 errors>10e-04 errors>10e-03
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pr
ob
. o
f d
et
ec
tio
n
EDM 1
EDM 2
EDM 3
Worst case inputs
Faults at output
Figure 27: Prob. of detection under worst case inputs, faults at output stage
errors EDM1 EDM2 EDM3
All errors 0.7815640 0.7717160 0.7399770
Significant errors 0.9985968 0.9988590 0.9530402
Table 5: Prob. of detection for a dynamic data range of  
7.2.7 Larger dynamic variation of data
So far we have been considering inputs with a dynamic data variation of  
 . We now
consider a set of experiments where the input has a larger dynamic data variation of 
in terms of the whole number portion and   in all. We do not expect the  values under
fault free conditions to vary considerably, as we divide the round-off errors by the norm of
the vector to make it input independent.
Table ¹²GÔ, illustrates the probability of detection for this data under random bit flips at
input. The probability of detection under similar faulty conditions for smaller dynamic data
variation of  
 is also shown for comparison in Table ¹²GI- .
We see that EDM 3 performs much poorer than the other two algorithms. For the other
two EDMs the detection capability does not vary too much with the change data dynamic
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Figure 28: Prob. of detection for a dynamic data variation of   , faults at input stage
errors EDM1 EDM2 EDM3
All errors 0.8061980 0.7959760 0.7887210
Significant errors 0.9982422 0.9984893 0.9765542
Table 6: Prob. of detection for a dynamic data range of  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range, however the detection probability of EDM 3 is considerably reduced. Looking at
the coverage characteristics in Fig. ¹G we observe that EDM 3 has a distinctly poorer
detection probability for higher dynamic data ranges. We see that although the bit-wise
error detection for a larger dynamic data range is poorer, for random bit flips and significant
faults the performance of EDs 1 and 2 are not very different for the two sets of data ranges.
This can be explained as follows. In case of large data range, for data elements with very
large magnitudes a bit flip say in bit number 20 has a much higher impact on its
magnitude than the same bit flip in a data element of smaller magnitude. But a small
change in magnitude in this small data element has a much lower impact on the computed
output (since this small magnitude element is added or subtracted to a much larger magni-
tude element and the change in its magnitude due to the error becomes a lot less significant)
as compared to the smaller data range case. Since we are interested in errors in the output
to determine if the injected faults are significant, the case described above is not consid-
ered. And when the same bit flip is introduced in a larger data element, the effect is a large
change in- input and hence the output and this is easily detected by the EDMs. Thus the
probability of detection of significant errors remains around the same for the two EDMs.
For EDM 3, from Fig. ¹²G , we see that from around bit number 20, it has a prob. of
detection less than 1. Assuming, significant errors occur from bit number 0 to 23(average
found from a million runs), we realize that 1(Sign bit) in every 23 bit flips is not detected.
7.2.8 Error Propagation across FFT stages
We observed above that the error detection does not vary too much across the various stages
of the FFT. In order to better understand this, we consider the 8x8 FFT. It can be recounted
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that the first element of the FFT of a vector is equal to the sum of the magnitudes of the
input vector elements. This element, which is also called the D.C component of the FFT,
has the highest magnitude as compared to the other elements of the FFT vector. Errors at
different elements have different impact on the computed output. It can be easily proved
that a constant error in the input vector will produce a constant error in the output vector.
( ]l]Qm¡=» } 657]4]Qmo» } ]l]nmo; , where  is the error in the input and X is the input
vector). Thus the probability of error detection for faults injected at the input stage depends
on the magnitude of error in the input. However for faults injected at the intermediate stages
of FFT, depending on the element number and whether it is real or imaginary, it is scaled
by a specific twiddle factor. Thus it is not necessary that a fault injected at an intermediate
stage will have a proportionate effect on the output.
We study the behavior of errors under such conditions. For each stage of the FFT, we
corrupt all elements of the 8 element vector. We plot the

values computed by the three
EDMs. We also determine the magnitude of error introduced by computing the difference
between all elements of the computed output and all corresponding elements of the output
under fault-free conditions. The norm of this difference vector represents the magnitude of
the error. A fixed bit location of 39 was chosen for these experiments because it has prob.
of detection less than one but large enough (based on our earlier experiments).
We see that faults at the input are always significant. Faults in the first element are also
always significant for all stages. The maximum error magnitude does not vary considerably
across the various stages. Thus although errors in the input stage are higher than the other
stages, errors in the intermediate stages are not significantly different from each other.
Errors at the output stage also have more constant magnitudes (or common magnitudes).
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Figure 29: Variation of delta for 1x8 FFT; injection in each element at stage 1
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Figure 30: Variation in the difference between computed output in fault-free and faulty
conditions of for 1x8 FFT for faults in each element at Stage 1
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Figure 31: Variation of delta for 1x8 FFT; injection in each element at stage 2
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Figure 32: Variation in the difference between computed output in fault-free and faulty
conditions of for 1x8 FFT for faults in each element at Stage 2
60
0 5 10 15
Element #
0
5e-11
1e-10
1.5e-10
2e-10
2.5e-10
3e-10
D
el
ta
F.V
JPL
Parseval
3rd Stage
39th bit corruption
Figure 33: Variation of delta for 1x8 FFT; injection in each element at stage 3
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Figure 34: Variation in the difference between computed output in fault-free and faulty
conditions of for 1x8 FFT for faults in each element at Stage 3
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Figure 35: Variation of delta for 1x8 FFT; injection in each element at Output stage
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Figure 36: Variation in the difference between computed output in fault-free and faulty
conditions of for 1x8 FFT for faults in each element at Output Stage
62
This is because there is no scaling by twiddle factors involved at the output. Obviously a
fault in the output stage effects only the element that is being injected and there is no further
impact on the other stages or other elements of the output vector. Since we are introducing
a fixed magnitude error in all these EDMs, the error magnitudes are equal in many cases
and hence we see a number of elements in the difference vector that are equal to each other
(since the difference vector represents the magnitude of error introduced).
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This thesis involves studying and comparing the existing approaches for Numerical result
checking under memory faults and implementing a fault injector. The fault injector was
used to simulate faulty conditions for the FFT applications under study.
We observe that EDM 1 has an error coverage that is equal to EDM 2 while taking half
the time to execute. Although,for complex inputs, it takes a higher time to execute than
EDM3 it has an error coverage that is highly superior to EDM 3. Thus EDM 1 distinctly
emerges as the ideal choice of an Error Detection Mechanism, based on our experiments.
While the fault injection is a tool capable of injecting different kinds of faults for our
study we restricted it to injecting faults into the heap of the application. This is because our
FFT application was storing data in dynamically allocated memory space. By choosing a
specific fault location in the data array (via API calls), we ensured that we have no latent
errors, i.e all injected faults do manifest into errors.
8.1 Relation between the three EDMs
The relation between the 3 EDMs is as follows. EDM2 is obtained from multiplying the
post-condition check with a probe-vector, also called the mapping   . EDM 1 can be in-
terpreted as the real-part of this post-condition check difference. EDM 1 introduces the
mapping in such a way that both the real and imaginary parts of the input and output are
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considered and we obtain a scalar that reflects the real-part of the computation. EDM 2
computes the real as well as imaginary part of the post-condition check. This can be bet-
ter explained with an example. Say we are interested in the accuracy of the computation
;Ê }Õ vxÑÉ }½Õ  . Ê }½Õ vx is analogous to the input vector and ;É }Õ  is analogous to
the mapping or the probe-vector   . Now any error in the input ;Ê }kÕ vx is reflected in both
the real part of the output which is ÊfGyÉ9>7vGI as well as the imaginary part of the output
which is ÊfGy } vGyÉ . Thus by being interested in only the real part of the computation, EDM
1 has cleverly reduced the number of computations by half while retaining the detection
capability. This can be seen in the detection probability of the two EDMs which are very
close to each other for all our experiments.
EDM 3 can be considered as equivalent to EDM 1 with a mapping vector equal to the
input vector itself. Thus the equation
u  J Ö5×tQ J Gy3 8  reduces to u  J Ö5ØtQ J G J 8 
. The RHS equation changes from tQ~G;]l]nmo   CC8 to tQ~G;]l]nmo J ¦¦8 or tQ~G¯8x
since ]l]Qm¡= 8 5b;]l]nmo=TC 8
8.2 Summary of Results
We set the thresholds for each EDM based on a million runs under fault-free conditions.
The thresholds were scaled to make them independent of input vector magnitudes and
vector length. It was found that EDM 1 and EDM 2 had lower thresholds than EDM
3. Also EDM 1 and EDM 2 had smaller variation of the threshold values with varying
input vector length. It was shown that all the three EDMs execute faster than the FFT
computation algorithm. This was accomplished by pre-computing some input independent
data offline and thus reducing the number of online multiplies. We showed that EDM 1 can
65
be reduced to '& online multiplies for complex input and   multiplies for real input. EDM
2 can be reduced to ®  online multiplies and EDM 3 involves   online multiplies.EDM3
was the fastest algorithm followed by EDM 1 and finally by EDM 2. The execution times
reported in this report also included the execution time for scaling  to obtain  .
We then evaluated the coverage of each of these EDMs and found that EDM 3 had the
worst performance owing to the fact that is incapable of detecting sign bit errors. For a bit-
wise corruption of data, it was found that the probability of detection starts falling below
from approximately bit number 40 for EDM 1 and EDM 2 while for EDM 3 it starts falling
from around bit number 30. The poorer performance of EDM 3 is more obvious in the case
where we considered only significant errors for random bitflips in the input. We considered
the significance of a fault in terms of the output computed rather than the input because
we are interested in the impact of a fault rather than the fault itself. Round-off noise was
estimated by evaluating the difference between the input vector and the inverse FFT of its
FFT. It was found that for errors of the order of  0  and smaller, this difference was
equal to the round-off noise in the fault-free case.
For significant faults, EDM 1 and EDM 2 had a very good probability of detection of
around 0.998 while EDM 3 had a detection probability of 0.976 for faults in the input stage.
Based on our performance results, we see that while EDM 1 and EDM 2 detect faults
upto the ') (+* bit, EDM 3 starts having a prob. of detection less than 1 from around bit num-
ber 30. Thus it can be inferred that not only must the mapping vector   not have a sparse
FFT, it should also be linearly independent of the input vector for optimal performance.
For large dynamic variation of data, it was found that the threshold

under fault-free
conditions does not change. This is because we scale  to make it independent of the
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magnitude of the input vector. The bitwise performance of the three EDMs deteriorates
under larger dynamic data. However, we realise that often enough a bit flip at a certain bit
number for larger data variation yields smaller errors in the output than the same bit flip in
a smaller data variation. Thus, when we consider the only significant errors, the probability
of detection does not change considerably for EDM 1 and EDM 2. For EDM 3 however,
the probability of detection reduces significantly.
Experiments reveal that the probability of detection does not vary for faults injected
at different stages of the FFT. In order to understand this, we studied the magnitude of
errors in the output for an 8-length FFT. It was shown that the magnitude of error for faults
injected in the intermediate stages depends not only on the magnitude of the error, but also
the element number in the data array. The magnitude of the error in the output also depends
on the magnitude of the input data element being injected with faults. Thus faults at various
stages of the FFT on an average resulted in errors of similar magnitudes.
Decreasing the dynamic range of data would result in a better bit-wise coverage, al-
though the over-all coverage for significant faults would not be effected.
8.3 Future Work
In this thesis our focus has been on faults in locations that are subsequently accessed by the
application. We do not introduce any latent faults. This was because we were interested in
evaluating and comparing the coverages of the three EDMs. It would be interesting to study
the performance of these EDMs under more real-life-like scenarios where faults could oc-
cur at random locations in the address space. This study would reveal the susceptibility
of a compute-intensive application such as this to faults in various segments of its address
67
space.
Our input data consisted of dynamic ranges of H
 and   . Our results show that for
significant errors, the error detection capability of the EDM 1 and EDM 2 is not compro-
mised for larger dynamic data range. We can study the performance of the EDMs under
higher dynamic data ranges and verify this.
Finally, we observed that the average prob. of detection does not vary for various stages
of the FFT. This was attributed largely to the variation in magnitude of data elements. It
would be interesting to study the probability of detection for data with no variation or
minimal variation in input data elements. This would give us a true sense of the impact of
errors at various stages.
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Bit Original Contents(X) Contents after bit flip( X) »@>½ÙS¦B&Ù
0 1.000000e+03 -1000.000000000000000 2.000000e+00
1 1.000000e+03 0.000000000000000 1.000000e+00
2 1.000000e+03 1.340781e+157 -1.340781e+154
3 1.000000e+03 1.157921e+80 -1.157921e+77
4 1.000000e+03 3.402824e+41 -3.402824e+38
5 1.000000e+03 1.844674e+22 -1.844674e+19
6 1.000000e+03 4294967296000.00000000000 -4.294967e+09
7 1.000000e+03 65536000.000000000000000 -6.553500e+04
8 1.000000e+03 3.906250000000000 9.960938e-01
9 1.000000e+03 16000.000000000000000 -1.500000e+01
10 1.000000e+03 4000.000000000000000 -3.000000e+00
11 1.000000e+03 2000.000000000000000 -1.000000e+00
12 1.000000e+03 744.000000000000000 2.560000e-01
13 1.000000e+03 872.000000000000000 1.280000e-01
14 1.000000e+03 936.000000000000000 6.400000e-02
15 1.000000e+03 968.000000000000000 3.200000e-02
16 1.000000e+03 1016.000000000000000 -1.600000e-02
17 1.000000e+03 992.000000000000000 8.000000e-03
18 1.000000e+03 1004.000000000000000 -4.000000e-03
19 1.000000e+03 1002.000000000000000 -2.000000e-03
20 1.000000e+03 1001.000000000000000 -1.000000e-03
21 1.000000e+03 1000.500000000000000 -5.000000e-04
22 1.000000e+03 1000.250000000000000 -2.500000e-04
23 1.000000e+03 1000.125000000000000 -1.250000e-04
24 1.000000e+03 1000.062500000000000 -6.250000e-05
Table 7: Effects of bit flips
A
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Bit Original Contents(X) Contents after bit flip( X) »@>½ÙS¦B&Ù
25 1.000000e+03 1000.031250000000000 -3.125000e-05
26 1.000000e+03 1000.015625000000000 -1.562500e-05
27 1.000000e+03 1000.007812500000000 -7.812500e-06
28 1.000000e+03 1000.003906250000000 -3.906250e-06
29 1.000000e+03 1000.001953125000000 -1.953125e-06
30 1.000000e+03 1000.000976562500000 -9.765625e-07
31 1.000000e+03 1000.000488281250000 -4.882813e-07
32 1.000000e+03 1000.000244140625000 -2.441406e-07
33 1.000000e+03 1000.000122070312500 -1.220703e-07
34 1.000000e+03 1000.000061035156250 -6.103516e-08
35 1.000000e+03 1000.000030517578125 -3.051758e-08
36 1.000000e+03 1000.000015258789062 -1.525879e-08
37 1.000000e+03 1000.000007629394531 -7.629395e-09
38 1.000000e+03 1000.000003814697266 -3.814697e-09
39 1.000000e+03 1000.000001907348633 -1.907349e-09
40 1.000000e+03 1000.000000953674316 -9.536743e-10
41 1.000000e+03 1000.000000476837158 -4.768372e-10
42 1.000000e+03 1000.000000238418579 -2.384186e-10
43 1.000000e+03 1000.000000119209290 -1.192093e-10
44 1.000000e+03 1000.000000059604645 -5.960464e-11
45 1.000000e+03 1000.000000029802322 -2.980232e-11
46 1.000000e+03 1000.000000014901161 -1.490116e-11
47 1.000000e+03 1000.000000007450581 -7.450581e-12
48 1.000000e+03 1000.000000003725290 -3.725290e-12
Table 8: Effects of bit flips contd.
Bit Original Contents(X) Contents after bit flip( X) »@>½ÙS¦B&Ù
49 1.000000e+03 1000.000000001862645 -1.862645e-12
50 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000931323 -9.313226e-13
51 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000465661 -4.656613e-13
52 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000232831 -2.328306e-13
53 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000116415 -1.164153e-13
54 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000058208 -5.820766e-14
55 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000029104 -2.910383e-14
56 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000014552 -1.455192e-14
57 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000007276 -7.275958e-15
58 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000003638 -3.637979e-15
59 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000001819 -1.818989e-15
60 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000000909 -9.094947e-16
61 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000000455 -4.547474e-16
62 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000000227 -2.273737e-16
63 1.000000e+03 1000.000000000000114 -1.136868e-16
Table 9: Effects of bit flips contd.
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